The justices of the Supreme Court have been drowning in
cases. As of 2004, the last year they gave us information through the
Philippine Statistical Yearbook, their case backlog (defined as case load minus
case outflow) was 6,882 cases. Divide that by 15 justices, and that means an
average of 458 cases each that the justices haven’t disposed of yet.
Meanwhile, new cases are coming in. Has this backlog been
reduced? Not if we go by the high court’s case disposition rate (ratio of total
cases decided/resolved in a year, over the total cases filed), which in 2003
and 2004 was 0.97. For the mathematically challenged, that means the
backlog is growing.
All this is by way of introduction. Each justice has so many
to take charge of that he/she usually doesn’t want to get involved with someone
else’s case by way of giving a dissenting or concurring opinion, unless it is
of great moment. Just take a look at the decisions handed down each month
(sc.judiciary.gov.ph) to see how few and far between those are.
That is why the decision in the case involving Regina O.
Reyes vs. Comelec and Joseph Socorro B. Tan (GR 207264) caught my eye.
There were three dissenting opinions and two separate concurring opinions.
That’s like the pork barrel case, for heaven’s sake. Not only that. What made
me sit up and take notice were the names of the dissenters: Arturo Brion,
Antonio Carpio, and Marvic Leonen, who I consider to be three of the high
court’s intellectual heavyweights.
That was enough for me to read all the case material.
Here’s the case in a nutshell: Regina O. Reyes filed her
candidacy as representative of the lone district of Marinduque in the last
elections. Her candidacy was questioned by Tan, a voter and resident of the
district. On what grounds? Essentially, that she lied about her civil status,
her birthday, her residence, and her citizenship. He brought the case to the
Commission on Elections. The Comelec found that she was a US citizen, and had
not renounced her US citizenship. Therefore, the Comelec cancelled her
certificate of candidacy (which means, among other things, that she is not a
valid candidate, and that all the votes in her favor are “stray” votes).
Her motion for reconsideration failing in the Comelec, Reyes
then filed her case in the Supreme Court, which decided in favor of the Comelec
(there was no grave abuse of discretion on its part) and Tan.
Everything looks on the up and up, right? Well, there
is a glaring error. Would you believe that the Comelec decided that she was an
American citizen on the basis of a blog? I kid you not. Justice Brion was
brutal: “Common sense and the minimum sense of fairness dictate that an article
in the Internet cannot simply be taken to be evidence of the truth of
what it says, nor can photocopies of documents not shown to be genuine be taken
as proof of the ‘truth.’ To accept these materials as statements of ‘truth’ is
to be partisan and to deny the petitioner her right to both procedural and
substantive due process. Again, at the very least, further inquiry should have
been made before there was the judgment.” Comelec Chair Sixto Brillantes had
similar thoughts in his dissent.
Then there is the matter of “undue haste” on the part of the
Supreme Court in making its decision (it dismissed the Reyes petition outright)
on the case. Reyes filed the case against the Comelec and Tan on June 7,
2013. The decision was handed down barely three weeks later, on June 25.
The high court did not even ask the Comelec, and Tan, for their answer (as
presumably is the usual procedure). Justice Brion calls the majority approach
“unusual,” and their rulings “strained,” which is why he could not allow it to
stand without comments. And he calls them “comments” rather than “refutations”
because the latter “implies a consideration on the merits of properly submitted
and debated issues, which did not happen in this case.”
Why was there this “rush to judgment” by the majority?
There’s the rub. The ruling would favor the son of a member of the high court,
which is why, failing all else, the high court should “at least hear and
consider both sides before making the ruling,” which it did not do.
Reyes’ opponent in the Marinduque elections was Lord Allan
Velasco, son of Justice Presbitero Velasco. This apparently was discussed in
the deliberations of the high court, but was not mentioned in any opinion
except Justice Brion’s. That has to explain the high court’s seeming
imprudence.
But the story does not end there. According to Justice
Carpio, the high court’s ruling is a “double flip-flop.” It reverses the
“well-settled” doctrines that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
acquires sole jurisdiction over any contest relating to the “election, returns
and qualifications” of House members, and that any question on the validity of
the proclamation falls under the sole jurisdiction of the HRET. Reyes was
proclaimed, so the high court should have stepped back. Why didn’t it? My
guess: If the HRET determines that Reyes is disqualified, Lord Allan Velasco
will have no advantage, and special elections will have to be held. Whereas if
the high court’s position was that the Comelec still has the power to stop her
proclamation, the votes for her will be regarded as stray, and her opponent
(Velasco) will win.
In other words, the high court’s decision has the effect of
disenfranchising 52,209 voters who voted for Reyes, and allowing Velasco to win
the elections with his 48,236 votes.
Lesson: 48,000 wins over 52,000 if the Supreme Court is on
your side.
Read more: http://opinion.inquirer.net/66885/double-flip-flop-by-high-court#ixzz2mrX4kkFq
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